CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: Of State Regulation, Tender Offers, and Necromancy by West, Brian S.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 77 | Issue 1 Article 6
1988
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: Of State
Regulation, Tender Offers, and Necromancy
Brian S. West
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Securities Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
West, Brian S. (1988) "CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: Of State Regulation, Tender Offers, and Necromancy," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 77 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol77/iss1/6
Notes
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America: Of State Regulation, Tender
Offers, and Necromancy*
And when he thus had spoken, he cried with a loud voice,
"Lazarus, come forth. "
And he that was dead came forth, bound hand and foot with
graveclothes: and his face was bound about with a napkin.
Jesus saith unto them, "Loose him, and let him go. "'
INTRODUCTION
In 1982 the Supreme Court decided Edgar v. MITE Corp.,'
striking down the Illinois Business Takeover Act2 as unconsti-
tutional under both the supremacy3 and commerce clauses.4 Since
then, state regulation of cash tender offers 5 once a booming
* The author would like to express his appreciation to Donald A. Winslow,
Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky, for his suggestions and
support.
** St. John 11:43-44 (King James).
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
1978 Ii. Laws 80-1421 (codified at ILL. RaY. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 137.5 (1979))
(repealed 1983).
U.S. CossT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
4 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
"Tender offer" (or "takeover offer") has been defined as:
An offer to purchase shares made by one company direct to the stock-
holders of another company, sometimes subject to a minimum and/or a
maximum that the offeror will accept, communicated to the shareholders
by means of newspaper advertisements and (if the offeror can obtain the
shareholders list, which is not often unless it is a friendly tender) by a
general mailing to the entire list of shareholders, with a view to acquiring
control of the second company. Used in an effort to go around the
management of the second company, which is resisting acquisition.
BLACKc's LAw DICnTONAY 1316 (5th ed. 1979).
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pastime of state legislatures, 6 has become almost a contradiction
in terms. The MITE decision became known as the "death
knell ' 7 of state authority in this area, marking the "demise of
traditional state takeover statutes. ' 8 After MITE, all that ap-
peared to be left to the states was the ability to enact "cotton
candy" statutes-lots of fluff, but little substance. As state and
federal courts applied the MITE rationale, statute after statute
was struck down as either being pre-empted by the Williams
6 Thirty-eight jurisdictions have tried some form of takeover provision in their
corporate regulatory laws. See AL.AsK STAT. §§ 45.57.010 to .120 (1980); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 67-1264 to 1264.14 (1980); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to .5-108 (repealed
1984); CoNN. GEN. STAT. AN. §§ 36-456 to -468 (West 1981 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE
ANm. tit. 8, § 203 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.35 to .363 (repealed 1979); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977 & Supp. 1982); HAwAu R.v. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15
(1976 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1980 & Supp. 1985); 1978 Ill.
Laws 80-1421 (repealed 1983); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-17-1 to -54-2 (West Supp. 1986);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.211 to .215 (West Supp. 1984-85); KA. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-
1276 to -1284 (1981); Ky. REv. STAT. ANm. §§ 292.560 to .991 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1981 & Supp. 1982); id. §§ 271A.396 to .399 (Supp. 1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
51:1500 to :1512 (West Supp. 1985) (repealed 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§
801 to 817 (Supp. 1984-85) (repealed 1985); MD. Cor's. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 11-
901 to -908 (1985) (repealed 1986); id. §§ 3-601 to -603 (repealed 1986); MAss. GEN.
LAW Am. ch. ll0c, §§ I to 13 (West Supp. 1985); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.810
to .814 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); MmNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01 to .13 (West Supp.
1984); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-101 to -121 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.500
to .565 (Vernon 1979); id. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1985-86); NEa. REv. STAT. §§ 21-
2419 to -2430 (1983); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 78.376 to .3788 (1979) (amended 1981, 1983,
repealed 1988)); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.A:1 to :16 (1983 & Supp. 1985) (found
unconstitutional in part 1983, amended in part 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to :19
(West Supp. 1985); N.Y. Bus. COr'. LAW §§ 1600 to 1614 (McKinney Supp. 1985)
(amended 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (1985); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§
1701.83.1 to .83.2, 1707.04.1 to .04.2 (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§
431 to 450 (repealed 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71 to 85 (Purdon Supp. 1985);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-10 to -110 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFMD LAWS
Am. §§ 47-32-1 to -48 (Supp. 1983) (various sections amended and repealed 1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-21-101 to -21-114 (1979 & Supp. 1983); Texas Administrative
Guidelines for Minimum Standards in Tender Offers, §§ 065.15.00.100 to .800, reprinted
in 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 55, 671-55, 682; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13
(repealed 1983); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1528 to -541 (1978 & Supp. 1983) (amended
1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01 to .25 (West Supplemental Pamphlet 1983) (amended
1985).
See Note, Edgar v. MITE Corp.: The Death Knell for the Indiana Takeover
Offers Act, 16 IND. L. REv. 517 (1983).
1 Note, The Demise of State Takeover Regulations, 11 N. Ky. L. REv. 613, 634
(1984). The author concluded that states will have to "completely revise their statutes
so they do not burden interstate commerce ... States whose statutes follow the tradi-
tional pattern will most certainly be determined unconstitutional." Id. at 634.
[VoL. 77
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Act9 (in all but the most mundane of matters) or as being
burdensome to interstate commerce, or both.10
In April 1987, with the art of a necromancer," the Supreme
Court breathed life back into state regulation of tender offers.
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,'2 the Court held,
this time with a majority voice,13 that the Indiana Control Shares
Acquisitions Act, 4 a statute similar to the one ruled unconsti-
tutional in MITE, was neither pre-empted by the Williams Act
5
nor violative of the commerce clause. 6 Once again, it appears
that states can enact tender offer regulation with teeth.
This Note first discusses the legislative history of the Wil-
liams Act, 17 the MITE decision, 8 statutes enacted after MITE, 9
and the Dynamics decision. 20 Second, it discusses (1) whether
MITE has effectively been overruled despite the Supreme Court's
elaborate distinctions between the two cases, 2' and (2) what
ramifications the Dynamics decision will have on future corpo-
rate statutes.22
9 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(f) (West 1981)).
1o See, e.g., Nat'l City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982)
(Missouri statute unconstitutional under supremacy and commerce clauses); Icahn v.
Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Missouri statute unconstitutional under
both clauses); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky statute
invalidated on commerce clause grounds). For a more comprehensive list of cases in
which state statutes have been held unconstitutional, see Recent Case, The Resurrection
of State Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751
F.2d [sic] (8th Cir. 1984), 34 DEPAuL L. Rv. 1109, 1115 n.44 (1985).
" A necromancer can, among other things, conjure spirits from the dead. WEBS-
TER's TmnI NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1511 (1986).
-2 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
"1 Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. Id. at 1640. In MITE, Justice
White wrote for a plurality. Parts I, II, and V-B became the opinion of the Court and
were joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens and O'Connor. See 457 U.S.
at 626 n.l.
" IND. CODE at §§ 23-1-42-1 to -10(a).
" See infra notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 177-96 and accompanying text.
'7 See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 42-111 and accompanying text.
"1 See infra notes 112-38 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 139-96 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 197-239 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 240-58 and accompanying text.
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I. Tm WILLIAMS ACT
Regulation of cash tender offers at any level began with the
enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,23 as amended
in 1968 by the Williams Act. The legislative history behind the
Act shows that Congress was trying "to protect the shareholders
of target companies. ' 25 Prior to the enactment, a corporate
raider could try to acquire control of a target corporation by
using a cash tender offer without stating from where he got his
money, who his associates were, or what his intentions were for
the future of the target once acquired. Such secrecy enabled
raiders to act quickly and silently, often forcing rushed decisions
by the shareholders of the target.2 To remedy these situations,
the Act, among other things, prohibits an offeror from using
the mails or any "instrumentality of interstate commerce" to
make a tender offer for any class of a registered equity security
if immediately after the consummation the offeror would be the
owner of more than five percent of the class, unless the offeror
first files specific information with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.27
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (West 1981).
15 U.S.C.A. at §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f).
2 Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977). The Court quoted
Sen. Kuchel as proof that "tender offerors were not the intended beneficiaries" of the
Act:
Today there are those individuals in our financial community who seek to
reduce our proudest businesses into nothing but corporate shells. They
seize control of the corporation with unknown sources, sell or trade away
the best assets, and later split up the remains among themselves. The
tragedy of such collusion is that the corporation can be financially raped
without management or shareholders having any knowledge of the acqui-
sitions.... The corporate raider may thus act under a cloak of secrecy
while obtaining the shares needed to put him on the road to a successful
capture of the company.
Id. (quoting 113 CONG. REc. 857-58 (1967)) (emphasis supplied by Supreme Court).
26 H.R. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONO.
& ADmN. NEWS 2811, 2812. See also 113 CONG. R c. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen.
Williams).
15 U.S.C.A. at § 78n(d)(1) in its entirety provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of the
mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any
facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, to make a tender
offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity
[VOL.. 77
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Nevertheless, the Act was criticized for discouraging takeover
bids "since they often serve a useful purpose by providing a
check on entrenched but inefficient management." 2 These crit-
icisms notwithstanding, the sponsoring Senator Williams replied
that such discouragement could be justified as "but a small price
to pay for adequate investor protection," 29 and the bill was
eventually passed.
30
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 31 the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress was adopting a "policy of neutrality in
contests for control." ' 32 The sole concern of Congress, the Court
concluded, was the protection of investors who had been made
an offer for their shares.3 3 The Court re-emphasized in Edgar v.
MITE Corp .4 that neutrality was an important characteristic of
security which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or any
equity security of an insurance company which would have been required
to be so registered except for the exemption contained in section 781(g)(2)(G)
of this title, or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, if, after
consummation thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be the
beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class, unless at the
time copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent
or given to security holders such person has filed with the Commission a
statement containing such of the information specified in section 78m(d)
of this title, and such additional information as the Commission may by
rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. All requests or invitations for
tenders or advertisements making a tender offer or requesting or inviting
tenders of such a security shall be filed as part of such statement and shall
contain such of the information contained in such statement as the Com-
mission may by rules and regulations prescribe. Copies of any additional
material soliciting or requesting such tender offers subsequent to the initial
solicitation or request shall contain such information as the Commission
may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, and shall be filed with
the Commission not later than the lime copies of such material are first
published or sent or given to security holders. Copies of all statements, in
the form in which such material is furnished by security holders and the
Commission, shall be sent to the issuer not later than the date such material
is first published or sent or given to any security holders.
113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967).
29 Id.
30 See supra note 24.
3 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
32 Id. at 29.
31 Id. at 35.
- 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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the Williams Act, which was designed to "avoid favoring either
management or the takeover bidder.""5
Although both Congress and the Supreme Court considered
neutrality a key component of the Williams Act, neither made
clear whether such neutrality was a characteristic required to be
present in any state regulation modeled after the Williams Act.3 6
State and lower federal courts, however, embraced the idea that
even-handed treatment of management and takeover bidders was
mandatory.3 7 This idea was likely the result of the MITE deci-
sion, even though the plurality's opinion did not mention neu-
trality as an affirmative regulatory goal.38 In CTS Corp. v.
15 Id. at 633.
36 The district court in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp.
389 (N.D. Ill. 1986), in granting a tender offeror's motion for declaratory judgment on
the constitutionality of Indiana's state regulatory scheme, relied upon Justice Powell's
concurrence in MITE, 457 U.S. 624, and noted that "[w]hether the policy of neutrality
behind the Williams Act was but a characteristic of legislation directed toward investor
knowledge, or was an affirmative regulatory goal, is in the abstract debatable." Dynam-
ics, 637 F. Supp. at 396.
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment because he agreed that the takeover act
violated the commerce clause. MITE, 457 U.S. at 654. However, Justice Powell was
"not persuaded ... that Congress' decision to follow a policy of neutrality in its own
legislation is tantamount to a federal prohibition against state legislation designed to
provide special protection for incumbent management." Id. at 655. In fact, less than a
majority was so persuaded, and Part V-A, which contained the provision in question,
did not become part of the plurality's opinion. Id. at 626.
37 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 10.
38 See supra note 36. The district court in Dynamics referred to Powell's concur-
rence as a "cautionary signal" that had been ignored by the state courts. Dynamics,
637 F. Supp. at 396.
Justice White in his dissent in Dynamics also believed that the MITE plurality had
embraced neutrality as an affirmative goal:
[I]t is clear to me that Indiana's scheme conflicts with the Williams Act's
careful balance which was intended to protect individual investors and
permit them to decide whether it is in their best interests to tender their
stock. As noted by the plurality in MITE, "Congress ... did not want to
deny shareholders 'the opportunities which result from the competitive
bidding for a block of stock of a given company,' namely, the opportunity
to sell shares for a premium over their market price."
Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1654 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting MITE, 457 U.S. at 633,
n.9) (emphasis added). White dissented partly because he believed the majority in
Dynamics had confused the protection of the shareholders as a group with the protection
of the individual investor, the latter being the policy of the Williams Act. The Indiana
Act did not further this policy, according to White, and thus should be stricken as being
against congressional policy. See Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1654.
[VOL. 77
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Dynamics Corp. of America,3 9 the Court vocally supported any
state law that furthers shareholder protection.40 Yet, the question
remains whether the statute approved by the Court actually
favors shareholders, rather than management or offerors.
41
II. EDGAR V. MITE CORP. AND THE DEATH OF STATE
REGULATION
In 1982 the Supreme Court decided Edgar v. MITE Corp.
42
and effectively put a stop to state regulation of cash tender
offers. MITE, a Delaware corporation with its principal offices
in Connecticut, attempted to acquire by a cash tender offer all
of the outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., an
Illinois corporation. 43 In compliance with the Williams Act, 44
MITE filed a Schedule 14D-141 with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, which stated that MITE was offering $28 a share,
four dollars greater than current over-the-counter prices of the
same shares. 46
MITE, however, did not comply with the provisions of the
Illinois Business Take-Overs Act,47 but filed an action in federal
district court 48 seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois
Act violated the commerce clause49 and was pre-empted by the
11 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 216-19.
41 See infra text accompanying notes 210-16.
12 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
41 Id. at 626-27.
" 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (West 1981).
41 A "Schedule 14D-I," named after § 14(d)(1) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, requires a takeover offeror who seeks to acquire more than 5% of any
class of equity security, voting or non-voting, to disclose the source of funds used to
acquire the shares, any past transactions with the target company, and any anti-trust
considerations or other problems that might result from the offer. MITE, 457 U.S. at
627-28 n.2 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1981)). A copy of the schedule must be sent
to the target's shareholders. Id.
6 Id. at 627-28.
41 1978 11. Laws 80-1421 (codified at ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 137.51 (1979))
(repealed 1983).
'4 The Northern District of Illinois (unreported opinion).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause provides: "Congress shall
have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce among the several states."
1988-89]
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Williams Act.50 Illinois Secretary of State James Edgar re-
sponded on February 1, 1979, by notifying MITE that he "in-
tended to issue an order requiring it to cease and desist further
efforts to make a tender offer for Chicago Rivet." '5' The next
day the district court "issued a preliminary injunction prohibit-
ing the Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois Act against
the takeover offer."52 On February 9, the court entered final
judgment, agreeing with MITE's pre-emption and commerce
clause arguments.5 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed.5 4 The Supreme Court, after noting
that the case was not moot, 5 affirmed the decision of the lower
courts two years later.5 6
A. The Illinois Act
The purpose of the Illinois Act was to protect "the interests
of Illinois security holders of companies having a close connec-
tion with [Illinois] without unduly impeding take-over offers,
and ... [strike] a balance that does not favor either management
of a target company 7 or an offeror."55 The Act required an
" See MITE, 457 U.S. at 628. By arguing that the Williams Act pre-empted the
Illinois Act, MITE was arguing that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional under the
supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, which provides that: "This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall
be the Supreme law of the land.. .
11 MITE, 457 U.S. at 629.
52 Id.
3 See id.
See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1980).
' MITE never actually went through with its tender offer. Chicago Rivet competed
with MITE by offering $30 a share. Subsequently, MITE and Chicago Rivet agreed to
withdraw their offers, and MITE agreed to either offer $31 a share by March 12, 1979,
or otherwise decide not to acquire Chicago Rivet's shares. MITE elected to not make
an offer. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 629.
The court of appeals held that the case was not moot since Secretary Edgar had
voiced his intention to enforce the Act as against MITE, and therefore, should the
district court's judgment be reversed, MITE would be liable criminally and civilly. See
MITE, 633 F.2d at 490.
The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' assessment of MITE's
situation and agreed that the case was not moot. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 630.
36 See id.
11 "Target company" as defined by the Act means:
a corporation or other issuer of securities (I) of which 10% of the out-
[VOL. 77
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offeror to file with the Illinois Secretary of State a registration
statement that publicly disclosed the intent to make a takeover
offer and the material terms of such offer. 9 In addition, the
following information had to be included in the registration
statement: (1) the identity of and material information about
the offeror, (2) the sources and amounts of funds to be used in
acquiring the shares, (3) the purposes of the takeover including
whether the offeror intended to liquidate, partially liquidate, or
otherwise make a material change in the structure of the target
corporation, (4) the number of shares of the target company
already owned by the offeror (in addition to any rights the
offeror may have to direct the voting of other shares), and (5)
any contracts, deals, arrangements or negotiations currently un-
derway which involve directly or indirectly the target's shares. 6°
Failure to comply with these provisions was unlawful and subject
to criminal as well as civil liability.
6'
After filing, an offeror had to wait twenty business days
before the offer became effective. During this time, the offeror
standing securities of the class of its equity securities which is the subject
of a take-over offer is held of record by securityholders located in [Illinois]
as determined by post office address as shown on the records of the issuer,
or (2) which meets any two of the following conditions:
(a) has its principal executive office in [Illinois];
(b) is organized under the laws of [Illinois];
(c) has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented
in [Illinois].
1978 Ill. Laws 80-1421 § 2.10.
11 Id. at § 1.1. An "offeror" is defined as:
a person who makes or in any way participates in making a take-over
offer, and includes all affiliates of that person. The term does not include
a financial institution or dealer loaning funds, or extending credit to any
offeror in the ordinary course of its business, or any accountant, attorney,
financial institution, dealer, soliciting dealer, newspaper or magazine of
general circulation, consultant, or other person, furnishing information,
services, or advice to, or performing ministerial or administrative duties
for, an offeror and not otherwise participating in the takeover offer.
Id. at § 2.05.
19 See id. at § 4B.
See id. at § 4C(l)-(8).
61 See id. at § 14. Violators of the Act, depending upon which parts of the Act
were violated, could be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor or a Class 4 felony or both.
See id. at §§ 14A-B.
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could disseminate information concerning the offer, but could
not make or consummate the actual offer itself.62
B. The Pre-emption Analysis
The Supreme Court began its pre-emption analysis by noting
that while Congress enacted the Williams Act as an amendment
to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Congress chose not
to amend section 28(a) of the 1934 Act.6 3 Section 28(a) provides
that "[n]othing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like
functions) of any [s]tate over any security or any person insofar
as it does not conflict with the provisions of this title or the
rules and regulations thereunder." Therefore, the Court rea-
soned, a state statute was void only if it "actually conflict[ed]"
with a federal law.6 A conflict exists "where compliance with
both federal and state regulation is a physical impossibility. .. , '6
or "where the state 'law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.' "67 Since MITE did not allege that compliance with both
the Illinois Act and the Williams Act was impossible, the Court
limited its analysis to "whether the Illinois Act frustrate[d] the
objectives of the Williams Act .... ,,68
The Court agreed with the court of appeals that there were
three provisions of the Illinois Act that stood as "obstacles to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."169 First, the provision for a twenty-
business-day walt after filing, after which the takeover offer
becomes effective,70 had no counterpart in the Williams Act.71
Under the Williams Act, "there is no precommencement notifi-
62 See id. at §§ 4E, 8(1).
6 15 U.S.C.A. at § 78bb(a).
64 MITE, 457 U.S. at 631 (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(a)).
11 See id. at 631.
6Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-
43 (1963)).
67 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
61 Id. at 631-32.
Id. at 634.
71 Id. at 634-35. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
71 MITE, 457 U.S. at 635.
[VOL. 77
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cation requirement; the critical date is the date a tender offer is
'first published or sent or given to security holders.' "72 The
Court held that:
[B]y providing the target company with additional time within
which to take steps to combat the offer, the precommencement
notification provisions furnish incumbent management with a
powerful tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detri-
ment of the stockholders who will not have an offer before
them during this period. These consequences are precisely what
Congress determined should be avoided, and for this reason,
the precommencement notification provision frustrates the ob-
jectives of the Williams Act.
73
The second objectionable provision of the Illinois Act was a
hearing provision 74 that introduced "extended delay into the
tender offer process."17 - The Court found of chief importance
the fact that there was no absolute deadline for the hearing's
completion. 76 The Court explained that since under the terms of
the provision management will almost always insist upon a hear-
7 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. at § 78n(d)(1)).
7' MITE, 457 U.S. at 635 (footnotes omitted). The Court noted that Congress had
chosen not to adopt a precommencement disclosure requirement three times in the past.
In 1965, Sen. Williams proposed a 20-day requirement that the S.E.C. deemed unnec-
essary for shareholder protection. See id. (quoting 112 CONG. REc. 19,005 (1966)). In
1967, Sen. Williams tried again, this time introducing a five-day precommencement
disclosure requirement. Again the bill was rejected. See id. at 636. Finally, a third
attempt was rebutted in 1970. See id.
74 1978 Ill. Laws 80-1421 § 7A-E. Subsection A provides in full:
The Secretary shall call a hearing if the Secretary deems it necessary for
the protection of offerees in [Illinois] or if within 15 business days after
the date of filing the registration statement a written request for a hearing
is submitted to the Secretary, by a majority of the directors of the target
company who are not officers or employees of the target company or by
a person or persons who are located in [Illinois] as determined by post
office addresses as shown on the records of the target company and who
hold of record or beneficially, or both, at least 10% of the outstanding
shares of any class of equity securities which is the subject of the take-
over offer.
11 MITE, 457 U.S. at 637.
76 See id. Subsection 7D of the Illinois Act provides in full that "[a] determination
shall be made within 15 business days after the conclusion of the hearing, unless such
time is extended by the Secretary as being in the interest of offerees in this state." 1978
Ill. Law 80-1421 § 7D (emphasis added).
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ing,77 management would have a " 'powerful weapon to stymie
indefinitely a takeover.' "78 Such "potential for delay provided
by the hearing provisions upset the balance struck by Con-
gress. .... 1179
Finally, the Court agreed with the court of appeals that the
Illinois Act was pre-empted "insofar as it allow[ed] the Secretary
of State ... to pass on the substantive fairness of a tender
offer." 80 The legislative history of the Williams Act indicated
that "Congress intended for investors to be free to make their
own decisions.... The act was 'designed to make the relevant
facts known so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to
make their decision.' "81 The Court quoted the court of appeals:
" '[t]he state thus offers investor protection at the expense of
investor autonomy-an approach quite in conflict with that
adopted by Congress.' "82
C. The Commerce Clause Analysis
The Supreme Court then held that the Illinois statute was
invalid under the commerce clause by applying the test in Pike
" See MITE, 457 U.S. at 637. Management need only control 10% of its com-
pany's shares to insist on a hearing. See also 1978 Ill. Laws 80-1421, § 7A.
11 MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th
Cir. 1980)).
71 MITE, 457 U.S. at 639. The Court cited numerous authorities that Congress
was against any delay which might successfully thwart a takeover offer. See, e.g., Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978). The Court noted the
position of the S.E.C. as explained in the S.E.C.'s Brief for Securities and Exchange
Commission as Amicus Curiae at 10 n.8:
[D]elay enables a target company to:
"(1) repurchase its own securities;
"(2) announce dividend increases or stock splits;
"(3) issue additional shares of stock;
"(4) acquire other companies to produce an antitrust violation
should the tender offer succeed;
"(5) arrange a defensive merger;
"(6) enter into restrictive loan agreements; and
"(7) institute litigation challenging the tender offer."
MITE, 457 U.S. at 638 n.13.
" Id. at 639. The Court was referring to 80-1421 § 7E which required the Secretary
of State to deny registration of a takeover offer if, inter alia, he found that the takeover
offer was "inequitable." Id.
11 MITE, 457 U.S. at 639 (quoting H.R. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968))
(emphasis added).
82 Id. at 640 (quoting Dixon, 633 F.2d at 494).
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v. Bruce Church, Inc.8 3 The Court noted that "[a] state statute
must be upheld if it 'regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental . . . unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.' "8 Adopting the language of Shafer v. Farmer's
Grain Co.,"5 the plurality found that the Illinois Act directly
regulated and prevented interstate takeover offers. 6 Further-
more, "the burden the Act impose[d] on interstate commerce
[was] excessive in light of the local interests the Act purport[ed]
to further."87
1. "Direct" Regulation of Interstate Commerce
Although states have been free to enact "blue-sky" laws, 8
which regulate intrastate securities, 89 such freedom has been
allowed by the courts because the laws "only regulated trans-
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
1M4TE, 457 U.S. at 640 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). The Court in Pike went
on to say that "[i]f a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree.... Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in
resolving these issues, [citations], but more frequently it has spoken in terms of 'direct"
and 'indirect' effects and burdens." Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (quoting Shafer v. Farmer's
Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925)),
91 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925).
6 MITE, 457 U.S. at 640.
" Id. The Court stated that the "most obvious" burden was the:
nationwide reach which purports to give Illinois the power to determine
whether a tender offer may proceed anywhere.... Shareholders are de-
prived of the opportunity to self their shares at a premium. The reallocation
of economic resources to their highest valued use, a process which can
improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender
offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well so that
stock prices remain high is reduced.
Id. at 643. The local interests which the Act purported to further were not given much
weight: "While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State
has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders," Ad. at 644. The Court
also doubted that the Illinois Act added any significant protections to the shareholders
that were not already provided by the Williams Act. See id.
n "Blue-Sky" laws are "state statutes [which providel for the regulation and
supervision of securities offerings and sales, for the protection of citfzen-investors from
investing in fraudulent companies.. . . [Such statutes are called 'blue-sky' lawsl because
[they pertain] to speculative schemes which have .no more basis than so' many feet of
blue sky." Br.Ac's LAw DicnoRvY 157 (5th ed. 1979).
" See MITE, 457 U.S. at 641.
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actions occurring within the regulating [s]tates." 9 Whenever
such laws affected interstate commerce, it was only "inciden-
tally." 91 However, the Court observed, the Illinois Act went
further than the scope of any constitutionally valid blue-sky law
because it directly regulated transactions that took place outside
of Illinois. 92 Tender offers are normally communicated to share-
holders everywhere through the mails or some other method of
interstate commerce.93 Since MITE was a Delaware corporation
and Chicago Rivet's shareholders resided in Illinois and else-
where, 94 some method of interstate trafficking had to be used in
order to make the tender. 95 The Illinois Act, "unless complied
with, sought to prevent MITE from making its offer and con-
cluding interstate transactions not only with Chicago Rivet's
stockholders living in Illinois, but also with those living in other
States and having no connection with Illinois. ' 96 More signifi-
cantly, the Illinois Act could have prevented a takeover even if
the corporation was not organized under the laws of Illinois and
there had not been a single shareholder of Chicago Rivet residing
in Illinois. 97 Such "sweeping extraterritorial effect" made the
Illinois Act a "direct restraint on interstate commerce.''98 This
logic did not represent the views of a majority of the Court,
however. Only Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor joined this part of Justice White's opinion. 99 Never-
theless, a majority of the Court did find a violation of the
commerce clause under another test.
90 Id. (citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1917)).
11 See id. (quoting Hall, 242 U.S. at 557-58)).
See id.
93 See id.
94 Approximately 27% of Chicago Rivet's stockholders were residents of Illinois.
See id. at 642.
95 See id.
96 Id.
9, See id. The Illinois Act applied when any two of the following conditions
existed: (1) the corporation had its executive office in Illinois, (2) was organized under
the laws of Illinois, or (3) had at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus
represented by stockholders who were residents of Illinois. See supra note 57.
- MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
See id. at 626.
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2. Excessive Burden on Interstate Commerce
The Supreme Court applied the Pike test'0° and found that
even though, arguendo, the Illinois Act may be said to have
"indirectly" regulated interstate commerce, such regulation was
too burdensome. 0' An obvious burden which the Act placed on
interstate commerce was the "nationwide reach" of the Act that
gave Illinois the power to prevent takeover offers which occurred
outside of Illinois. 10 2 The state's interest in protecting local af-
fairs was a valid one, but the Court found no legitimate interest
in protecting nonresident stockholders. 0 3
Finally, the Court rejected an argument by the Illinois Sec-
retary of State that Illinois had "an interest in regulating the
internal affairs of a corporation incorporated under its laws."
1°4
The Court explained that takeover offers are not considered to
involve internal affairs of a corporation. "Tender offers contem-
plate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and do
not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target com-
pany."105 In addition, the Act could apply to a corporation
which is not an Illinois corporation and which does not have its
principal place of business in the state, since the Act applies to
takeover offers of any corporation which has ten percent of its
shares owned by Illinois residents. °6
After this analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals' decision striking down the Illinois Act as unconstitu-
100 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
"I MITE, 457 U.S. at 643-46.
102 See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. Apparently, while a majority of
the court was not willing to call such pervasive reach a "direct" regulation of interstate
commerce, a majority was willing to call it a "burden."
103 See MITE, 457 U.S. at 644.
114 Id. at 645.
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes
that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's
internal affairs [which include] matters peculiar to the relationships among
or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and share-
holders-because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting
demands.
Id. (citing RlSTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 comment b (1971)).
105 Id.
106 See id.; see also 1978 Ill. Laws 80-1421 § 2.10(1).
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tional. However, the fragmented decision left some clues that
state regulation of tender offers might not be completely dead.
Justice Powell concurred with the "burden on interstate com-
merce" analysis because "its Commerce Clause reasoning [left]
some room for state regulation of tender offers."' 7 Justice
Stevens joined Justice White's commerce clause analysis but
elected against joining the pre-emption segment. 0 8 Justice
O'Connor also joined in the commerce clause reasoning but
thought the pre-emption issue was unnecessarily decided. ,09 Justice
Marshall dissented, finding the case moot, and was joined by
Justice Brennan."0 Justice Rehnquist also found the case non-
justiciable."' The MITE decision, then, did not stand on the
most solid of foundations. Yet in the years that followed MITE,
courts struck down a vast array of tender offer statutes as if the
Supreme Court had laid down a unanimous mandate that states
were to steer clear of takeover offer regulation. The highly
fragmented MITE decision should have been recognized as a
harbinger that the last word in state regulation of tender offers
had not been written.
III. Tim SECOND GENERATION TAKEOVER STATUTES
After the MITE"2 decision, several states went back to the
drawing board in an effort to correct the flaws that were fatal
to the Illinois statute. Generally, three "types""11 3 of statutes
emerged, and each type has been named for the state which
originally brought it into existence.
"07 MITE, 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
,0 Id. at 654-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
,0 MITE, 457 U.S. at 655 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
,U0 See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
,,3 Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities-An
Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1429-30 (1985). "Type" is the word chosen by Mr. Lipton
and Mr. Brownstein. They provide a basic description of each type. Because of the
impossibility of improving upon their already concise and informative analyses of these
statutes, this author will attempt to do no more than paraphrase Mr. Lipton's and Mr.
Brownstein's ideas. The reader is encouraged to look to their article and the statutes
themselves for the exact wording.
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A. The Ohio Type
Ohio's law 14 requires shareholder approval prior to the con-
summation of any tender offer, public or private, for shares
whose percentage of the corporation totalled above 20%, 33 1/
3%, and 50% thresholds. 115 If a quorum of the disinterested
shareholders then voted on the tender offer, and a majority of
these votes were in favor of the offer, then the purchase would
be authorized.1 6 A corporation could opt out of the statute's
application if its by-laws or articles of incorporation expressly
provided." 7 Minnesota" 8 and Wisconsin" 9 have enacted similar
statutes.
20
This type of statute was viewed as a "promising alternative"
to the Illinois Act: 121
The MITE opinion apparently leaves room for regulation of a
corporation's internal affairs. Justice White wrote in his Com-
merce Clause analysis that "tender offers ... do not them-
selves implicate the internal affairs of the target company."
The Ohio Act, however, does not purport to regulate tender
offers themselves .... Rather, . . . [the Act] regulates acqui-
sitions of controlling interests of corporate stock-fundamental
changes in the internal structure of corporations. 22
The Ohio Act had the additional saving grace of applying only
to Ohio corporations that have their principal place of business,
principal executive offices, or substantial assets located in that
state. 12 Thus, while the Act seemed to fit within the constitu-
"'4 Owo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83.1 (Anderson 1985).
", See id. at 1701.01(Z)(1). Obtaining voting power at any of these three levels is
classified as a "control share acquisition." Id.
116 See id. at § 1701.83.1(E)(1). In addition, the acquisition must be consummated
"not later than three hundred sixty days following shareholder authorization of the
control share acquisition." Id.
"7 See id. at § 1701.83.1(A).
"' MiN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West Supp. 1985).
' Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.69 (West Supp. 1984-85) (repealed 1985).
11 See Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 113, at 1429.
2I Note, The Constitutionality of Alaska's Takeover Bid Disclosure Act, 1 ALASKA
L. RiEV. 335, 346 (1984).
'2 Id. at 347 (quoting MITE, 457 U.S. at 645) (emphasis in original).
I" See Orno REv. CODE ANN. at § 1701.01(Y). This section defines "issuing public
corporation" to which section 1701.83.1 purports to apply. See id. at § 1701.83.1(A).
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tional guidelines set out by MITE, much of the state's power
was necessarily limited.
B. The Maryland Type
Maryland's Act'24 imposed super majority voting require-
ments for mergers, sales of assets, liquidations, and recapitali-
zations (excluding takeover offers) between an in-state corporation
and an interested shareholder, unless the transaction met fair
price requirements set forth in the statute.'15 If such fair price
requirements 126 were not met, approval could be obtained only
,24 MD. Cowps. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 - 3-603 (1984) (amended 1985).
,2 See id. at § 3-601(e)(l)-(5).
126 See id. at § 3-603(b)(l)-(2). The section provides for an exemption from § 3-602
if each of the following conditions is met:
(1) The aggregate amount of the cash and the market value as of the
valuation date of consideration other than cash to be received per share
by holders of common stock in such business combination is at least equal
to the highest of the following:
(i) The highest per share price (including any brokerage commis-
sions, transfer taxes and soliciting dealers' fees) paid by the interested
stockholder for any shares of common stock of the same class or series
acquired by it:
1. Within the 2 year period immediately prior to the announce-
ment date of the proposal of the business combination; or
2. In the transaction in which it became an interested stock-
holder, whichever is higher; or
(ii) The market value per share of common stock of the same class
or series on the announcement date or on the determination date,
whichever is higher; or
(iii) The price per share equal to the market value per share of
common stock of the same class or series determined pursuant to
subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, multiplied by the fraction of:
I. The highest per share price (including any brokerage com-
missions, transfer taxes and soliciting dealers' fees) paid by the
interested stockholders for any shares of common stock of the same
class or series acquired by it within the 2 year period immediately
prior to the announcement date, over
2. The market value per share of conimon stock of the same
class or series on the first day in such 2 year period on which the
interested stockholder acquired any shares of common stock.
(2) The aggregate amount of the cash and the market value as of the
valuation date of consideration other than cash to be received per share
by holders of shares of any class or series of outstanding stock other than
common stock is at least equal to the highest of the following (whether or
not the interested stockholder has previously acquired any shares of a
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by both an 80% vote of all outstanding shares and a 66 2/3%
vote of all disinterested shares. 127 Like the Ohio statute, a cor-
poration could opt out of the Act's application.
128 Connecticut,12 9
Kentucky, 130 Michigan,", and Wisconsin 32 all enacted statutes
similar to that of Maryland.
33
C. The Pennsylvania Type
Pennsylvania's statute 34 requires the acquirer of 30%70 or
more of a Pennsylvania corporation's voting shares to pay a
particular class or series of stock):
(i) The highest per share price (including any brokerage commis-
sions, transfer taxes and soliciting dealers' fees) paid by the interested
stockholder for any shares of such class of stock acquired by it:
1. Within the 2 year period immediately prior to the announce-
ment date of the proposal of the business combination; or
2. In the transaction in which it became an interested stock-
holder, whichever is higher; or
(ii) The highest preferential amount per share to which the holders
of shares of such class of stock are entitled in the event of any voluntary
or involuntary liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the corporation;
or
(iii) The market value per share of such class of stock on the
accouncement date or on the determination date, whichever is higher;
or
(iv) The price per share equal to the market value per share of
such class of stock determined pursuant to subparagraph (iii) of this
paragraph, multiplied by the fraction of:
1. The highest per share price (including any brokerage com-
missions, transfer taxes and soliciting dealers' fees) paid by the
interested stockholder for any shares of any class of voting stock
acquired by it within the 2 year period immediately prior to the
announcement date, over
2. The market value per share of the same class of voting stock
on the first day in such 2 year period on which the interested
stockholder acquired any shares of the same class of voting stock.
2 See id. at § 3-602(l)-(2).
2 See id. at § 3-603(c).
See 1984 CoNs. AcTs § 84-431 (Reg. Sess.).
See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397-.399 (Baldwin 1984) (renumbered 271B.12-
210 to .12-230 effective Jan. 1, 1989).
" See MICH. Corn'. LAws ANN. § 450.1775-.1784 (West 1984).
" See Wis. STAT. ANN. at § 180.725 (amended 1983). Note that Wisconsin's statute
contains attributes of both the Ohio type and the Maryland type.
0I See Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 113 at 1429-30.
"4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
"fair value" price to any remaining shareholders desiring to sell
their shares. 135 A corporation had the opportunity to opt out if,
within ninety days after enactment, the corporation amended its
by-laws accordingly.
13 6
Both the Maryland and Pennsylvania type statutes are "fair
value" statutes and, as such, have been highly praised as "com-
port[ing] with the goals of tender offer regulation.' 13 7
The Maryland and Pennsylvania statutes have been narrowly
tailored to achieve [the] legitimate state interests [of regulating
the internal affairs of domestic corporations and protecting
local shareholders]. They apply only to domestic corporations
and become effective only after the offeror has become a
shareholder of significant size. Further, they are directed at
the fairness of transactions, an area historically left to the
states. Lastly, they are simply extensions of traditional state
internal affairs regulation of appraisal rights and shareholder
approval of mergers." 8
Again, ilthough the pitfalls of MITE were apparently avoided,
any teeth left in the statutes were baby teeth. Indiana found the
choice of statute types unacceptable and proceeded to enact a
statute with a healthier set of orthodontia. Indiana did take one
hint from the statutes-the internal affairs doctrine was made a
more central feature of the statute.
"I See id. at § 1910E:
A shareholder making written demand ... shall be entitled to receive cash
for each of his shares in an amount equal to the fair value of each voting
share as of the day prior to the date on which the control transaction
occurs, taking into account all relevant factors, including in increment
representing a proportion of any value payable for acquisition of control
of the corporation. Either the controlling person or group or the share-
holder may proceed under subsections F through I of section 515 for a
determination of the fair value of such share as defined in this subsection.
136 See id. at § 1910A.
"I Bainbridge, State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations Post-MITE: The
Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania Attempts, 90 DICK. L. REv. 731, 774_(1986).
"I Id. at 773. Incidentally, Mr. Bainbridge dismissed the Ohio type statute as
unconstitutional because it went beyond the traditional limits of the internal affairs
doctrine by governing shareholder relations with non-shareholders. See id. at 775.
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IV. CTS CORP. V. DYNAMICS CORP. OF AMERICA: THE REBIRTH
OF STATE REGULATION
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,139 the Supreme
Court once again addressed the question of how far a state may
go in regulating tender offers in an effort to protect resident
shareholders. At issue was whether the Indiana Business Cor-
poration Law140 was constitutional, notwithstanding Edgar v.
MITE Corp.,' 4' which was decided four years prior to the en-
actment of the Indiana statute.
A. The Indiana Act
In 1986 the Indiana legislature enacted the Business Corpo-
ration Law, a part of which was the Control Shares Acquisitions
Chapter. 42 Under the Act (unless a corporation elected to opt
out of its application before August 1, 1987),'4 any Indiana
corporation which is an "issuing public corporation" is subject
to the provisions of the Control Shares Acquisitions Chapter.144
An "issuing public corporation" is defined by the Act to be:
[A] corporation that has:
(1) One hundred (100) or more shareholders;
(2) Its principal place of business, its principal office, or
substantial assets within Indiana; and
(3) Either:
(A) More than ten percent (10%) of its shareholders resi-
dent in Indiana;
(3) More than ten percent (10qo) of its shares owned by
Indiana residents; or
(C) Ten thousand (10,000) shareholders resident in Indi-
ana. 145
-3 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
,40 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-17-1 to -54-2 (Bums Supp. 1986) (various sections
amended 1987 and 1988).
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
" IND. CODE AN. at §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11.
Id. at § 23-1-42-5.
See id.
1' Id. at § 23-1-42-4(a).
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The Court summarized the material provisions of the Act as
follows:
The Act focuses on the acquisition of "control shares" in an
issuing public corporation.... [Ain entity acquires "control
shares" whenever it acquires shares that, but for the operation
of the Act, would bring its voting power in the corporation to
or above any of three thresholds: 20%70, 33 1/3%, or 50%. 146
Once an entity acquires the control shares, it can vote the shares
only "to the extent granted by resolution approved by the share-
holders of the issuing public corporation."' 47 A majority vote
of the disinterested 48 shareholders of each class is necessary
before the acquiring corporation can vote its shares. 149 Thus, the
pre-existing disinterested stockholders effectively have the power
to decide whether the merger can go through.
5 0
The shareholders have fifty days to hold a special meeting,
after the acquiring corporation demands such meeting, to vote
and decide whether to allow the acquirer to vote its shares.1
5 ' If
the shareholders choose not to restore the voting rights, the
corporation may redeem the acquired shares if redemptions are
permitted under the target corporation's own articles or bylaws.
However, there is no requirement that the target must do so.152
'" Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1641 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1).
14, Id. (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9(a)).
141 "Disinterested" shares are those shares which are not "interested" shares;
"interested" shares are defined by the Act to mean:
[Tihe shares of an issuing public corporation in respect of which any of
the following persons may exercise or direct the exercise of the voting
power of the corporation in the election of directors:
(1) An acquiring person or member of a group with respect to a
control share acquisition.
(2) Any officer of the issuing public corporation.
(3) Any employee of the issuing public corporation who is also a
director of the corporation.
IND. CODE ANN. at § 23-1-42-3.
,41 Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1641 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9(b)).
150 Id.
" See IND. CODE ANN. at § 23-1-42-7.
112 See id. at § 23-1-42-10. Even if the target corporation decides to redeem the
shares, the redemption price may not necessarily allow the acquiring corporation to get
back all of its investment. The shares are redeemable at their fair market value, and any
control premium paid over this amount will not be recoverable. See id.
[VOL. 77
CTS CoRP. v. DYAK.cs CORP.
B. The Facts of the Case
On March 10, 1986, Dynamics Corporation of America (Dy-
namics) owned slightly under ten percent of the stock of an
Indiana corporation, CTS Corporation (CTS). On that date,
Dynamics publicly declared a tender offer for enough shares to
put it above the twenty percent threshold. 53 Relying upon the
MITE decision, Dynamics, on March 31, sought to have the
Indiana Act declared unconstitutional under the supremacy clause
and the commerce clause. The Uffited States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois granted declaratory relief to
Dynamics, 154 holding that the Act "wholly frustrat[ed] the pur-
pose and objective of Congress in striking a balance between the
investor, management, and the takeover bidder in takeover con-
tests.' 5 One week later, the district court agreed with Dynam-
ics' commerce clause arguments and held that the Act "create[d]
an impermissible indirect burden on interstate commerce.'
' 56
Because a majority of courts had held that state laws which
unfairly advantaged management in takeover battles were in
conflict with the Williams Act, despite the "cautionary signals"
of MITE, the court "accept[ed] as given" that the Indiana Act
was also invalid under the supremacy clause.Y
7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision and re-examined Dynamics'
pre-emption argument.'58 The court found the rationale of MITE
to be "straightforward" in its application:
The Indiana statute upsets the balance struck by the Williams
Act. Whether it does so more than the Illinois statute struck
down in MITE is hard to say. The statutes are incommensu-
rable .... If we had to guess we would guess that the Indiana
statute is less inimical to the tender offer, but that is unim-
portant. The Indiana statute is a lethal dose; the fact that the
Illinois statute may have been two or three lethal doses has no
" See Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1642. Dynamics' ownership would have been
increased to 27.5%. See id.
" Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Id. at 399.
Id. at 406.
117 See id. at 396-97.
M' Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
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practical significance.... In any event, if the Williams Act is
to be taken as a congressional determination that a month
(roughly) 5 9 is enough time to force a tender offer to be kept
open, 50 days is too much; and 50 days is the minimum under
the Indiana Act if the target corporation so chooses.
160
The court then went on to affirm the commerce clause challenge
61
and the internal affairs challenge.1
6 2
On April 21, 1987, the Supreme Court reversed.1
6
1
C. The Pre-emption Analysis
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the pre-
emption part of the opinion in MITE did not carry a majority
of the Court and hence was not binding. Furthermore, the Court
held that the Indiana Act passed muster even if the pre-emption
argument had been backed by a majority.' 64 The Court reasoned
that "the overriding concern of the MITE plurality was that the
Illinois statute.., operated to favor management against offer-
ors, to the detriment of shareholders. By contrast, the [Indiana]
statute... protects the independent shareholder against both of
the contending parties." 165 Such protection came within the spirit
of the Williams Act-even-handed treatment of bidder and in-
vestor. 166
The Court then pointed out the key differences between the
Illinois and Indiana statutes: The Indiana Act did not provide
"either management or the offeror an advantage in communi-
"9 Under the Williams Act, a tender offer normally must be held open for at least
20 business days. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986). Counting weekends and any
holidays, this period of time could be anywhere from 26 to 30 days.
16 See Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 262-63.
6I See id. at 264.
161 See id. The court held that "the effect on the interstate market in securities and
corporate control is direct, intended, and substantial; it is not merely the incidental
effect of a general regulation of internal corporate governance." Id.
10 Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1644.
' See id. at 1645. This is of key importance. The court did not affirm the MITE
analysis but only purported to pass the Indiana statute under it.
165 Id.
11 See id. at 1645-46.
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cating with the shareholders about the impending offer."' 167 The
Court also found that the Act did not "impose an indefinite
delay on tender offers."'' 6 Theoretically, an offeror could com-
plete his purchase of shares by the twentieth business day, the
earliest day permitted under the Williams Act. 169
The Court ignored the court of appeals finding that, from a
practical point of view, the Indiana Act can "delay consum-
mation of tender offers until 50 days after the commencement
of the offer.' ' 70 The reasoning of both the court of appeals and
Dynamics was that:
[N]o rational offeror will purchase shares until it gains assur-
ance that those shares will carry voting rights. Because it is
possible that voting rights will not be conferred until a share-
holder meeting 50 days after commencement of the offer,
Dynamics concludes that the Act imposes a 50-day delay. This,
it argues, conflicts with the shorter 20-business-day period
established by the SEC as the minimum period for which a
tender offer may be held open.'
7'
But the Supreme Court found the conflict "iusory," 172 In the
first place, there was still no "absolute 50-day delay on tender
offers,"'' 73 and nothing prevented a would-be purchaser from
making a conditional tender offer-an "offering to accept shares
on the condition that the shares receive voting rights within a
certain period of time."' 74
167 Id. at 1646. The Illinois Act provided that a takeover offer could not become
effective until after a 20-business-day wait after filing with the Secretary of State. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text. During that period management would have
nearly a month to dissuade shareholders from selling without worrying that some
shareholders might sell immediately.
Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1646.
Id. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a).
110 Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1646-47.
17' Id. at 1647.
172 Id.
13Id.
17' Id. The Court surmised that since conditional tender offers were valid under the
Williams Act (the condition being subsequent regulatory approval), there was "no Teason
to doubt" that a condition that the shares must receive voting rights is also valid. Id.
Dynamics responded by arguing that "conditional tender offers are not an adequate
alternative because they leave management in place for three extra weeks, with 'free rein
to take other defensive steps that [would] diminish the value of tendered shares."' Id.
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Finally, even if the Act did cause some delay to the takeover
process, "nothing in MITE suggested that any delay imposed by
state regulation, however short, would create a conflict with the
Williams Act.' ' 75 Only "unreasonable" delay creates such con-
flict. 17 6
The Court then turned its attention to the commerce clause
analysis of the court of appeals.
D. The Commerce Clause Analysis
After describing the history of the commerce clause, 77 the
Court noted that statutes which are held to infringe upon the
clause do so because (1) the statutes discriminate against inter-
state commerce, 78 or (2) the statutes subject certain commercial
activities to inconsistent regulations. 179 The Court found neither
of these two problems to exist with respect to the Indiana Act. 80
In holding that the Indiana Act did not discriminate against
interstate commerce, the Court noted that the Act had the same
effects on takeover offers regardless of whether the offeror was
a domiciliary or a resident of Indiana. 8' Neither was the Court
impressed by Dynamics' contention that the Act would most
often apply to non-Indiana entities. 8 2 Even though empirical
evidence showed that most hostile takeover attempts came from
offerors outside of that state, 83 " '[tihe fact that the burden of
at n.9 (quoting Brief for Appellee Dynamics Corp. of America 37).
The Court rejected the argument, saying that such actions on the part of manage-
ment would be unlikely, and even if management did take steps to diminish the shares'
value, remedies at the state court level would become available to the acquirer. Id.
17 Id. at 1647 (emphasis supplied by Court).
176 Id. The Court noted that under the Williams Act there is a 60-day maximum
period for tender offers to be consummated. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(5) (West 1981).
Since the Indiana Act provides for the voting rights to either vest or not vest within 50
days of the making of the offer, the Court could not find the delay unreasonable.
Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
17 See Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1648.
178 See id. (citing Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37
(1980)).
,79 Id. at 1649 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986)).
180 Id.
181 See id. at 1648-49.
18 See id. at 1649.
183 Id.
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a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not,
by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate
commerce.' "4 Since the Indiana Act imposed no greater bur-
den on out-of-state tender offerors than it did on in-state tender
offerors, the Court found no discrimination. 85
In holding that the Indiana Act did not subject tender of-
ferors to inconsistent regulation, the Court explained that "[s]o
long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations
it has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of
only one State.' ' 8 6 The Court relied heavily upon the definition
of "corporation" found earlier in the Act, 187 and apparently
came to the conclusion that the definition of "issuing public
corporation"' 8 8 incorporated the earlier definition of corporation
and did not constitute a specific exception to the general defi-
nition.'8 9
The Court did not apply the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.'19
test which was used by both the plurality in MITE and the court
"I See id. (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978)).
i See id.
186 Id.
I " 'Corporation' ... means a corporation for profit that is not a foreign cor-
poration, incorporated under or subject to the provisions of this article." IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-20-5 (Burns Supp. 1987). A "foreign corporation" means "a corporation
for profit incorporated under a law other than the law of Indiana." Id. at § 23-1-20-
11.
' The definitions section of the Act provided that "[t]he definitions in this chapter
apply throughout the article." Id. at § 23-1-20-1. The definition of "issuing public
corporation" presupposes that there is first a "corporation" as defined earlier in the
Act. See supra text accompanying note 145.
10 There is a strong argument that the Indiana legislature intended that "issuing
public corporation" be an exception to the general definition of "corporation." "Issuing
public corporation" is defined only for the purposes of "this [Control Shares Acquisi-
tion] Chapter." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (Burns Supp. 1987). The definition then
goes on to define "issuing public corporation" as having . . . "[ilts principal place of
business, its principal office, or substantial assets within Indiana.. ." Id. at § 23-1-42-
4(2). It seems an unreasonable assumption that the Indiana legislature intended that an
Indiana corporation with over 100 shareholders, more than 10% of which were Indiana
residents (or more than 10% of the shares were owned by Indiana residents), would not
be subject to the Act simply because they had no substantial assets within the state, and
their principal place of business and office were elsewhere. A more likely assumption is
that the definition of "issuing public corporation" meant to include foreign corporations
which had substantial ties with Indiana.
Whatever the intent of the legislature, however, the Supreme Court interpreted
Indiana's Act only to apply to Indiana corporations.
--' 397 U.S. 137 (1969).
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of appeals in Dynamics. 91 The Court criticized the lower court
for "fail[ing] to appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause
analysis of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance
is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are
a product of state law .... By prohibiting certain transactions,
and regulating others, such laws necessarily affect certain aspects
of interstate commerce."' 92
In concluding its analysis, the Court posited that "Dynamics'
argument that the Act is unconstitutional ultimately rests on its
contention that the Act [would] limit the number of successful
tender offers."' 193 The Court found "little evidence" that this
result would occur. 94 But, even if it did, it would not have
seriously affected the Court's commerce clause analysis: The Act
did not foreclose "any entity-resident or nonresident-from
offering to purchase ... shares in Indiana corporations, or from
attempting thereby to gain control.' '1 95 The Act's only purpose
was to supply better protection for the shareholders.1 96
V. RATIONALIZING MITE AND DYNAMICS
After Dynamics, two similar state statutes have been ana-
lyzed by the Supreme Court-the Illinois Act having been struck
and the Indiana Act having survived. The question remains
whether Edgar v. MITE Corp. 97 has been effectively overruled
by CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. ,'1  or whether the
Supreme Court has changed its method of analyzing state tender
offer statutes.
A. The Current Status of the Pre-emption Argument
Few should be surprised that the Court in Dynamics did not
find the Indiana Act pre-empted by the Williams Act, since only
"I See Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 263.
19 Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1649-50.
91 Id. at 1652.
19 Id.
195 Id.
1% See id.
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
"' 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
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three justices'99 found the Illinois statute pre-empted in MITE.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist did not even reach
the merits in MITE,200 so their positions on the pre-emption issue
were not taken into account. These three justices were in the
majority in Dynamics, which did not find pre-emption by the
Williams Act.20' Also in the majority were Justice O'Connor and
Justice Powell, who were in the MITE plurality but did not join
the pre-emption part of the opinion. 202 Justice Blackmun and
Justice White, dissenters on the pre-emption issue in Dynamics,
were two of the three justices in favor of pre-emption in MITE. 2 3
Chief Justice Burger, the third justice in favor of pre-emption
in MITE, had retired by the time of Dynamics.
To that extent, MITE has never been overruled-MITE was
never holding, only dicta. However, the reliance of lower courts,
both state and federal, on the pre-emption part of the MITE
opinion had effectively turned the dicta into law.20 Thus, it is
not overstepping the bounds of propriety to say that the pre-
emption aspect of MITE has been "overruled."
It is no wonder, then, that the Supreme Court chose not to
rely on the fact that the pre-emption analysis was never law and
instead attempted to distinguish the Indiana Act from the Illinois
Act on that point.205 The Court distinguished the delays that
were inherent in each Act. The Illinois Act did not allow a
takeover to take effect until the shareholders had been given
twenty business days to consider the proposal.26 The Indiana
Act allowed for immediate tender of shares but did not allow
voting rights to vest in the acquired shares until an affirmative
"9 Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Brennan. See supra notes 107-
11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
10 See Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1640.
See id.
Compare MITE, 457 U.S. at 626 n. + with Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1640.
2m See supra note 10; see also Note, supra note 121, at 345 ("Although MITE does
not completely prohibit state regulation of tender offers, the cases following MITE have
interpreted its holding broadly.... Despite this ... attitude toward state takeover
legislation, there appear to be alternative approaches [which] ... avoid direct conflict
with federal securities laws." (emphasis added)).
205 See supra text accompanying notes 165-76.
See 1978 Ill. Laws 80-1421 § 4E.
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vote to do so was cast by the disinterested shareholders. 20 7 The
special meeting at which this vote took place had to occur within
fifty days after the tender offer was announced. 208 Although
Dynamics argued that no corporation headed by rational minds
would purchase shares until voting rights vested, the Court rea-
soned that a conditional offer would be appropriate. 20 9
However, the Court's reasoning seems a little superficial.
Although "[t]he [Indiana] Act does not impose an absolute 50-
day delay on tender offers, ' 210 it is reasonable to assume that
in many cases the special meeting will not take place until several
days after the expiration of the twenty-business-day requirement
of the Williams Act, which is about twenty-eight calendar days. 21'
This leaves twenty-two days beyond the limit imposed by the
Williams Act. In MITE, however, Justice White's opinion pointed
to the legislative history of the Williams Act and noted that even
a five-day precommencement notification requirement had been
rejected by Congress.2 2 The precommencement notification was
therefore rejected in MITE, the rationale being that the target
company was provided with "additional time within which to
take steps to combat the offer. ' 21 3 While the Indiana Act vali-
dates offers from the moment made, without imposing any
precommencement walt, the target's management still has plenty
of time to combat the offer, three additional weeks after the
deadline in the Williams Act, much more than the five days
rejected by Congress.
Justice White cited numerous evils of delay, and incorporated
into his opinion the S.E.C.'s list of seven ways that target
management may benefit from a delay.2 4 This list was cited in
connection with the Indiana Act's hearing provision, which left
1 See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7 (Burns Supp. 1987).
See id.
See Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1647 n.8. The Court pointed to a case in which
the S.E.C. approved a tender offer conditioned upon the "removal of a 'lockup option'
that would have seriously diminished the value of acquiring the shares of SCM Corpo-
ration." See id. (citing Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., ML LBO,
781 F.2d 264, 272 n.7 (2d Cir. 1986)).
210 Id. at 1647.
21, Assuming four weekends and no holidays.
212 See supra note 73.
213 MITE, 457 U.S. at 635.
214 See supra note 79.
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open the possibility that the Secretary of State might render a
decision way beyond the time limit imposed by the Act.215 In
other words, one defect in the Illinois Act was that there was a
possibility of an extended delay, though the Act sought to limit
the time for the Secretary to make his or her decision. On the
other hand, one of the saving graces of the Indiana Act was the
possibility that the offer would be consummated within the
twenty-business-day limit of the Williams Act and not extend
delay to the fifty-calendar-day deadline allowed by the statute.
The White opinion in MITE does not give the benefit of doubt
to the Illinois statute, whereas the majority opinion in Dynamics
does. This can be further illustrated by noting that under the
Illinois Act, there is also the possibility that the Williams Act
deadline will not be exceeded. If, one week after the filing of a
tender offer, the Secretary calls a hearing, the entire hearing and
decision could be accomplished by twenty calendar days. The
bottom line is that both statutes could cause a delay to the
takeover process, but the Indiana Act was given the benefit of
the doubt.
The fact that one statute, and not the other, had a pre-
commencement notification requirement does not make the con-
sequences any less serious. Since under the Indiana Act the
target's management had fifty days before any voting rights
vest, they would have had ample time to persuade noninterested
shareholders to vote not to revest the voting rights by (1) an-
nouncing a plan to repurchase its own securities, or (2) announc-
ing a dividend increase, should voting rights not have been
granted. Of course, since under the Act the acquiring corpora-
tion will already have purchased the shares, it will also be entitled
to a chance to submit their shares for repurchase or receive a
dividend; nevertheless, its takeover would be thwarted. Further-
more, if the acquiring corporation made its offer subject to a
condition precedent that voting rights be revested, then upon a
215 See MITE, 457 U.S. 637. The Secretary had to make a decision within 15 days
after a hearing had been held, which could be called any time prior to the commencement
of the offer. See 1978 Iil. Laws 80-1421 § 7. Thus, unless the Secretary found that the
offer was inequitable or any disclosure requirement had not been met, the decision had
to be completed within 35 days after a tender offer had been filed. This is 15 days less
than the 50-day requirement of the Indiana Act.
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negative vote by the shareholders the offer would be withdrawn,
and the would-be acquirer would not even be entitled to a
repurchase or a dividend.
Finally, even if the acquirer made a conditional offer under
the Indiana Act, the result would be the same as if there were
a fifty-day precommencement notification requirement. The
practical effect of not being able to vote purchased shares-lack
of control of the target-is the same as if the shares were never
purchased. There is delay, there is lack of control of the target,
and there is the possibility that a hostile merger will not succeed.
Thus the Illinois Act and the Indiana Act are virtually indistin-
guishable in result.
Apparently, the Court found favor with the Indiana Act
because it adopted the "market approach to investor protec-
tion, ' 216 which commentators have argued should be the basis
for state statutes. 217 The market approach "is based on the
notion that the tendering decision should be made by an in-
formed shareholder alone."2 18 Certainly the Court was impressed
by the absence of any governmental role in the statute: The Act
"[does not] allow the state government to interpose its views of
fairness between willing buyers and sellers of shares of the target
company. Rather the Act allows shareholders to evaluate the
fairness of the offer collectively.' '219 This language indicates that
the Supreme Court will tolerate state statutes that work to favor
the shareholders of a target corporation but not the offeror or
the target's management.
The market approach was adopted in the Minnesota Cor-
porate Take-Overs Act2 ° and was upheld in 1984 as constitu-
tional by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Cardiff
216 Bainbridge, supra note 137, at 758.
217 See, e.g., id. ("In the context of a shareholder tender decision, such an approach
is correct; the investor should be allowed to decide whether to accept or reject the offer
without management or state interference."); see also Note, Can State Tender-Offer
Regulation Be Made Constitutional? Edgar v. MITE Corp., 20 Hous. L. Ray. 1475,
1489 (1983) (suggesting that a state legislature "should repeal all portions of a regulatory
statute that suggest a benevolent bureaucratic, rather than a market, approach to investor
protection").
28 Bainbridge, supra note 137, at 758.
219 Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1646 (emphasis supplied by Court).
MINN. STAT. §§ 80B.01-.13 (1986) (amended 1987).
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Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch.21 Under the Minnesota statute there
was no provision for a precommencement notification period, 
2
n
and both the takeover offeror and the target management were
precluded from disseminating information while the takeover
offer was "suspended."223 A takeover offer was suspended if
the State Commissioner of Commerce determined that "the reg-
istration statement [did] not contain all of the information [re-
quired by the Act] or that the take-over offer materials provided
to offerees [did] not provide full disclosure to offerees of all
material information concerning the take-over offer."' 4 The
suspension is only temporary-the Commissioner must hold a
hearing process within sixteen calendar days,25 much less than
the twenty-business-day period mandated in the Williams Act.
No suspension could be based on the "unfairness" of the tender
offer,2 leaving any equity decisions to the shareholder, and not
a government official. 7 The shareholders would make their
decisions by tendering-or refusing to tender-their shares.
The court of appeals also upheld provisions of the Minnesota
Act that required disclosure of certain information,25 which was
not required to be disclosed by the Williams Act:
[T]he additional disclosures required by the Minnesota Act will
aid Minnesota shareholders in appraising the value of a tender
offer and will not result in the shareholders receiving a mass
of irrelevant information that will serve to confuse rather than
enlighten. The additional disclosures are primarily concerned
with the impacts of the proposed takeover on Minnesota resi-
dents, including employees and suppliers. 29
-1 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984).
22 See Recent Case, supra note 10, at 1121.
"I See MIN. STAT. at § 80B.05(4).
"A Id. at § 80B.03 Subd. 4a.
21 Id. at § 80B.03 Subd. 5.
n6 Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 911.
2' The presence of a government official was a flaw in the Illinois statute. See
supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
2m Compare MINN. STAT. § 80B.03(6)(a)-(e) (1986) with 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d)(1)
(West 1981 & Supp. 1988) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1984). See Cardiff, 751 F.2d at
911-12 n.5.
Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 912.
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Thus, the Minnesota statute passed muster because it emphasized
shareholder protection-with the shareholders as watchdogs-
rather than emphasize avoidance of hostile takeovers.
The courts have made it clear in Dynamics and Cardiff that
statutes which favor shareholders, but not offerors or manage-
ment, will survive the MITE scrutiny. Yet, it has already been
argued that the Indiana statute protects management to the
detriment of the tender offeror. 20 There is still another view
that alleges that the takeover offeror is given an advantage by
the Indiana Act: " '[S]hareholders may tender more frequently
under a control share acquisition statute than a fair price pro-
vision,' and ... acquirers would prefer an Indiana type statute
to either a fair price statute231 like Maryland's, 2 2 or a right of
redemption statute23 like Pennsylvania's. '23 4 In fact, according
to one author, "[a] control share acquisition statute actually
may work in favor of the acquirer." 235
The Supreme Court's opinion [in Dynamics] ... treats the
Indiana statute's mandate of a shareholder vote on a proposed
transaction as a deterrent to making a tender offer. Interest-
ingly, the central theme of defensive planners has been pre-
cisely the opposite: A successful defensive tactic is one that
precludes shareholders from having the opportunity to accept
a hostile offer, not one that grants them the right to accept
one, whether individually or collectively.... Thus, one char-
acterization of an Indiana type statute is that it gives acquirers
exactly what they have always wanted-the chance for the
23 See supra text accompanying notes 210-16.
23, Under a fair price statute any shareholder has the right to receive the fair market
value of his or her shares in the event of a successful merger. How he or she enforces
the right is a matter of statute, but generally a shareholder will at least have the right
to whatever the price on the market, or, as in the Maryland Statute, infra note 232, a
value determined by a formula involving the current market price and the price the
shareholder paid for the shares, if such price is higher.
232 MD. CoRsS. & Ass'NS CODE ANm. § 11-901-908 (1976).
23 A right of redemption is similar to a fair price statute. In fact, one author refers
to both Maryland's and Pennsylvania's statutes as containing "fair value redemption
rights." Bainbridge, supra note 137, at 744. Pennsylvania's "right of redemption" statute
is codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1910(A) (1985 Supp.) (amended 1983).
23 R. GumsON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUIsrrTONS 194 (1987 Supp.)
(quoting Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111,
169 (1987)).
21, Id. at 194.
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shareholders to decide whether to accept a premium over mar-
ket for their shares.
236
The author posits that the best argument that the target man-
agement is given an advantage under the Indiana Act is that the
fifty-day-delay can force "additional financing costs on the ac-
quirer, and simply increase the chance that something fortuitous
will occur-perhaps an increase in interest rates-that will make
the acquirer go away of its own accord. ' 237 However, the author
contends that this is a "thin reed on which to build a pro-target
argument.' '238
Thin reed or not, the Supreme Court has made clear that
delay is unwanted in the context of tender offers, and whether
the target management or the offeror is favored by delay, there
seems to be a good argument that the Indiana Act, in the name
of shareholder protection, upsets the balance achieved by the
Williams Act. The fact that the Indiana Act was held constitu-
tional leads inevitably to the conclusion that the Williams Act
does not establish a carved-in-stone balance of investor protec-
tion and takeover offer protection that can never be modified.
Rather, the Williams Act protects the investors, and attempts by
the states to advance that protection will be held valid. Justice
Powell stated that "the overriding concern of the MITE plurality
was that the Illinois Statute ... operated to favor management
against offerors, to the detriment of shareholders. By contrast,
the [Indiana Statute] protects the independent shareholder against
both of the contending parties." 23 9
B. The Current Status of the Commerce Clause Argument
The Indiana Act survived the commerce clause challenge
because of the Supreme Court's insistence that the Control Shares
Acquisitions Act applied only to corporations which were Indi-
ana residents: "We agree that Indiana has no interest in pro-
tecting non-resident shareholders of non-resident corporations.
But this Act applies only to corporations incorporated in Indi-
"' Id. at 195-96.
"I Id. at 195.
23 Id.
"I Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1645.
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ana." m The notion has already been suggested that the Indiana
legislature might not have intended that the Act apply only to
Indiana corporations, 241 but the above passage seems to make
such an interpretation a requirement for constitutionality.
There might be an additional requirement for an Act to be
constitutional-that there must be a substantial number of share-
holders residing in the state.242 The Court cited the Indiana Act's
provision, 243 which calls for ten percent of the corporation's
shareholders or 10,000 shareholders, whichever is lower, to be
residents of Indiana, or, alternatively for ten percent of the
corporation's paid-in surplus to be represented by Indiana resi-
dents. "Thus," said the Court, "every application of the Indiana
Act will affect a substantial number of Indiana residents ... "2
Therefore, the Supreme Court might have forged a two-
prong test: To pass constitutional muster a state tender offer
law must provide that (1) the target be a resident of the state,
and (2) the target be represented by a substantial number of the
state's residents, or have a substantial number of assets repre-
sented in the state.
Under such a test, Cardiff appears no longer to be valid. In
that case there was no requirement by Minnesota that the target
corporation be incorporated in Minnesota. To be a "target
company" under the Act, the corporation merely had to be an
issuer of publicly traded shares at least twenty percent of which
had to be owned by Minnesota residents, and the corporation
had to own or control assets, located within Minnesota, which
had a fair market value of at least $1,000,000. 245 The court of
appeals distinguished the Minnesota Act from the Illinois Act,
since the former Act would never apply unless a substantial
number of Minnesotans were shareholders of the target, and the
latter Act could apply even when none of the shareholders were
Illinois residents.46 However valid the distinction, the Minnesota
Act does not pass the two-prong test of Dynamics.
2'* Id. at 1651-52.
2A1 See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
242 See Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
2A1 See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(3) (Burns Supp. 1987).
244 Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
24 See MINN. STAT. ANN. at § 80B.01 Subd. 9.
24 See Cardiff, 751 F.2d at 911.
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Another casualty of the two-prong test could be the state of
Delaware, notorious for its pro-corporate disposition in its in-
corporating laws. Assuming that most states enacted a takeover
law like Indiana's, Delaware would have little to do with most
of its chartered corporations:
2
A
7
Because of the Indiana statute's jurisdictional focus on share-
holders resident in the enacting state, a similar Delaware statute
would apply to very few Delaware chartered corporations....
If this interpretation of [Dynamics] is right, then other states
may have the chance to make some headway against Dela-
ware's dominant position in the market for corporate char-
ters.248
Delaware, as might have been expected, has risen to meet
the challenge, and is determined to see if the second prong of
the test has indeed become a portion of the Court's holding. To
Delaware, it is irrelevant how much of a corporation's assets are
in the state, provided the corporation is organized under the
laws of the state. The Delaware Supreme Court in McDermott,
Inc. v. Lewis249 summarized the Dynamics holding as follows:
"In [Dynamics], the Court ruled that a state does not violate
the commerce clause, notwithstanding heavy burdens imposed
upon interstate commerce, if a state is merely regulating the
internal affairs of its own corporations."2 0
It is not only Delaware's judiciary which has spoken out on
this matter; the Delaware legislature has also embraced the in-
ternal affairs doctrine as a panacea for controlling hostile tak-
eovers. Delaware Governor Michael Castle signed a takeover bill
into law25' on February 2, 1988,252 a law which "bars most hostile
takeovers by bidders who own 15 percent of the target's shares
241 R. Gasori, supra note 234, at 193.
248 Id.
2,9 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987). The issue in the case was "whether a Delaware
subsidiary of a Panamanian corporation [could] vote the shares it holds in its parent
company under circumstances which are prohibited by Delaware law, but not the law
of Panama." Id. at 208. The court answered the question in the affirmative.
2" Id. at 217, n.12.
"I Business Combinations with Interested Stockholders, DEL CODE ANN* tit. 8, §
203 (1988) (reprinted in 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 209 (Feb. 5, 1988)).
2 See 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 188 (Feb. 5, 1988).
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unless they gain 85 percent of the target's outstanding stock." 253
The law applies only to Delaware corporations, 254 but nowhere
in the Act is there any requirement that a substantial number of
assets or stockholders be located in Delaware, or that the cor-
poration have a principal office within the state.
It remains to be seen what effect the Delaware Statute will
have on hostile takeovers. T. Boone Pickens has blasted the law
as "an entrenchment device that hurts shareholders.1 255 Martin
Lipton, on the other hand, has said that the Act is "a meaning-
less statute in terms of protection against takeover abuses.1
2 6
William Freeborn, Governor Castle's legislative liaison, asserts
that the Act "negates the effects of a potentially hostile takeo-
ver," but adds that the Act is an "extremely moderate" piece
of legislation.
25 7
Despite Mr. Freeborn's claim that the statute is moderate,
two corporations, Black & Decker and Campeau Corp., have
already challenged the constitutionality of the Act. 258 Should one
of these companies pursue and win its claim in court, Delaware
will suffer a heavy blow to its position as the guardian of
corporate America. Delaware's regulation of the internal affairs
2 See id. The Act provides (omitting a "grandfather" clause for corporate stock-
holders with holdings of greater than 15% prior to the passage of the Act) that:
[A] corporation shall not engage in any business combination with any
interested stockholder for a period of 3 years following the date that such
stockholder became an interested stockholder, unless ... upon consum-
mation of the transactions which resulted in the stockholder becoming an
interested stockholder, the interested stockholder owned at least 85% of
the voting stock of the corporation outstanding at the time the transaction
commenced....
DEL. CODE ANm. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (1988). A "business combination" is defined as inter
alia:
[A]ny merger of consolidation of the corporation or any direct or indirect
majority-owned subsidiary of the corporation with (A) the interested stock-
holder, or (B) with any other corporation if the merger or consolidation is
caused by the interested stockholder and as a result of such merger or
consolidation subsection (a) [(the "grandfather" clause)] is not applicable
to the surviving corporation.
Id. at § 203(c)(3)(i).
21 See 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 188 (Feb. 5, 1988).
25 Id.
256 Id.
27 Id.
258 Id.
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of only the corporations that have substantial contacts in Dela-
ware could be a job tantamount to that of the Maytag repair-
man.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that a state can pass a takeover statute
like Indiana's and have it pass constitutional muster. However,
there is a possibility that an act with more stringent requirements
than the Indiana Act may also pass muster. To the extent that
a statute uses the market approach to shareholder protection,
pre-emption can be avoided; but a hearing held by a state
official, ala Cardif, might also be permissible providing that
the official does not rule on the equity of the offer, but only
on the extent to which the acquiring corporation has complied
with disclosure requirements. 259 Also, a state can force an ac-
quirer to file more information than the Indiana Act required,
again thanks to Cardiff.26°
Finally, as long as the target is incorporated in the state, the
state can rely on the internal affairs doctrine to regulate takeov-
ers, as long as the target has a substantial connection to the
state.261 How much will satisfy the "substantial" test is any-
body's guess. In the Indiana Act there are ten percent thres-
holds,2 2 but if Delaware gets its way, perhaps one day the
"substantial" requirement will be obliterated. Each state would
have the sole power to regulate takeovers of corporations char-
tered there.
At any rate, whether or not Dynamics has, effectively over-
ruled MITE, the spectre of unconstitutionality has been removed
from the states' ability to erect takeover laws. In the future,
there may well arise state statutes that make the Indiana Act
look mild by comparison.
Brian S. West
21 See supra text accompanying notes 223-27.
m See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
26, See supra text accompanying notes 242-44.
2 See supra text accompanying note 145.
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